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We analyze the dynamic effect of prices and price volatility on current oil production, both on 
the level of country groups and the major individual producer countries. A comprehensive 
dataset at monthly frequency allows us to include a rich lag structure while controlling for key 
global and local determinants as well as seasonality. Our set of explanatory variables also 
includes real economic activity, investment, the strength of the U.S. dollar and institutional 
quality. We provide a naïve regression analysis using a broad model to show that lagged 
explanatory variables are important determinants of current oil production. We find that the 
reaction of oil production is heterogeneous across both country groups and the major 
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1  Introduction 
Oil is for apparent reasons one of the global commodities most studied by economists. Key areas 
of interest include price formation, i.e. the role of speculation versus fundamental drivers; the 
interaction of prices with other economic variables such as exchange rates and GDP; and the drivers of 
oil supply. While there has been much empirical work on the determinants of OPEC production, less 
effort has been devoted to a systematic investigation of global oil production. In this paper we take a 
naïve approach and estimate models to identify the relationship between country-specific oil 
production decision and world oil market prices as well as price volatility, while controlling for other 
important determinants of oil production decisions. By including lags of our explanatory variables that 
range from a decade ago to today we can analyze the response of oil production to specific influences 
over time.  
In general, oil production has been analyzed from two perspectives. Since a major feature of 
fossil fuels is their nature, namely their exhaustibility and their geologic attributes, one stream of 
literature investigates whether oil production develops according to economic models of exhaustible 
resources based on Hotelling (1931), or whether oil production more closely relates to the question of 
worldwide oil depletion as suggested by Hubbart (1956). This stream of literature has produced mixed 
results given that the assumptions required in each model, such as the geographic scope of production, 
determine the predicted production pattern to some degree.  
A second stream of literature examines the strategic behavior of the major oil producers.  For 
example, the focus is on competition (i.e. MacAvoy, 1982) and revenue targets (i.e. Teece, 1982) in 
examining OPEC.  Followers of the cartel hypothesis test if OPEC is a monopoly, an oligopoly, or if it 
acts as a dominant firm. Griffin’s seminal paper (1985) is the starting point for numerous contributions 
to the cartel hypothesis and also analyzes the potential mechanisms used to steer production, mostly 
based on current price and production data. One conclusion is that production in non-OPEC and OPEC 
countries reacts differently to current price changes, yet there are also differing interpretations about 
the exact nature of the potentially strategic interactions. Some authors (Griffin, 1985, Jones 1990) 
claim that OPEC acts as a cartel or a bureaucratic syndicate (Smith, 2005), others (Alhajji and 
Huettner, 2000) find that market results can be explained by Saudi Arabia’s dominant role, and a few 
researchers promote the “target revenue hypothesis” (Griffin, 1985, Ramcharran, 2002, Alhajji and 
Huettner, 2000), and the existence of a quota system (Kaufmann et al., 2008).  
The empirical stream of literature disregards the importance of a range of prices prior to the 
current period for future oil production. However, oil production follows physical investment with a 
significant time lag of seven to ten years (Wurzel et al., 2009). Investments in R&D can take even 
longer to result in actual oil production. Therefore, short-run adjustments in oil supply due to price 
changes differ significantly from long-run adjustments determined by investment decisions. In 
addition, limited competition in oil production leads to a scenario in which investment decisions are a 
potentially strategic instrument just like actual production decisions.    3
Structurally, the global oil market has changed substantially since 1974. Whereas OPEC 
dominated the market until the early 1980s in terms of prices and quantities, several private companies 
have invested heavily in exploration and development. Recent figures suggest that non-OPEC 
production accounted for roughly 60% in 2009 (BP, 2010). Most remarkable is the increase of oil 
production from non-OECD/non-OPEC countries, which increased their share in global production 
from 29% in 1994 to 34% in 2009, at the same time the share of OECD producers decreased from 32% 
to 25%. We are interested in the major determinants of production in all countries, i.e. the high prices 
triggering exploration activities; financial crises implying economic downturns and hence negative 
growth in oil consumption; terrorist attacks delaying or even alienating investments, etc.  
This paper analyzes in detail the effect of a range of current and past alterations in prices and 
price volatility on oil production in three groups of oil producing countries while controlling for the 
output effects of additional explanatory variables, such as investment, real economic activity, price 
volatility, strength of the U.S. dollar, etc. We base our analysis on an extensive sample of monthly data 
which allow for the inclusion of a rich lag structure. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section II introduces the corresponding data and methodology. Section III presents and 
discusses our results. Section IV gives our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
2  Data and Model Specification 
2.1  Data and basic intuition 
The existing literature shows that a number of global and local factors may affect oil production 
in individual countries. Among the key global variables are the price of oil, price volatility, the state of 
the overall macroeconomic environment, and the strength of the U.S. dollar. Two significant local 
variables are the amount of investment in oil exploration and production and a country’s own 
institutional quality. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis.  
In order to capture the supply side of the global oil market as fully as possible we compile a 
comprehensive dataset at monthly frequency which encompasses the majority of countries and 
virtually all global crude oil production. We use monthly crude oil production data for the period 
1994-2009 as provided by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA). Our daily data on the key 
benchmark crude oil spot price, WTI, covering the period 1986-2009 from which we compute monthly 
averages also derives from the EIA. As a measure of oil price volatility we compute the monthly 
standard deviation of daily log returns based on the WTI price. 
We control for the state of the macroeconomic environment by using a comprehensive global 
real economic activity index proposed by Kilian (2009) and used by He et al. (2010) which captures 
important developments while avoiding shortcomings of the obvious alternative measures, such as 
GDP or industrial production. These alternatives may either not be available on a global level or may   4
not be comparable across countries due to different methodologies and standards in the various 
national statistics offices. Exchange rate effects also may distort these measures.  
Future production possibilities are closely related to current and past investment activities. We 
use country-level rig count data obtained from Baker Hughes as a proxy for investment in oil 
exploration and production (Ringlund et al., 2008). A country’s institutional set-up, while only 
changing very slowly, is a strong determinant of overall economic success in the long term (Acemoglu 
et al, 2001; Faria et al, 2010). Including institutional quality indicators is novel in the literature on 
energy economics and allows us to control for time-varying country individual effects.
4  
 
2.2  Descriptive statistics 
We allocate the countries in our sample to three main groups: OPEC
5, OECD and non-
OPEC/non-OECD. This division is in contrast to most of the related literature, e.g., Griffin (1985) and 
subsequent studies, which only distinguish between OPEC and non-OPEC. While the distinction of 
crude oil producing countries into OPEC and non-OPEC may have been appropriate in the past, we 
believe that a further subdivision of non-OPEC countries is warranted.  
Table 1 indicates significant diversity between the local explanatory variables for the three 
country groups. Rig count activity differs substantially, particularly regarding its variation around 
mean activity. OPEC has both the lowest number of rigs and the smallest variation around the mean. 
The OECD region exhibits the most pronounced dynamics, driven by U.S. and Canadian rig activity, 
in terms of both the mean number of rigs and the extent of variation around the mean. The non-
OECD/non-OPEC group exhibits intermediate variation in its investment activity. Since rig count is 
not a perfect proxy for investment, we need to assume a direct relationship between rig activity and 
investment in oil production and a stable relationship across countries. While this may be a strong 
assumption, we believe that including the rig count is preferable to not including it, given the lack of 
available data on investment.  
Governance indicators also differ across country groups and are highest for the OECD group and 
lowest for OPEC. However, based on the institutional indicators, with values above zero indicating 
above-average performance relative to the other countries, both OPEC and non-OECD/non-OPEC 




                                                 
4 We include the mean of the World Bank’s six country-level governance indicators: i) voice and accountability, ii) political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, iii) government effectiveness, iv) regulatory quality, v) rule of law and vi) control 
of corruption, which are available at annual frequency. The indicators are defined to range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values indicating higher quality in the respective category (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Values above zero indicate above-average 
performance on that particular indicator. 
5 We follow the IEA’s definition of OPEC membership (IEA, 2009), so that we treat Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Venezuela as OPEC members throughout the sample period. 
Thus, e.g., Indonesia is considered a non-OPEC country throughout.    5
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Sources: Crude oil production and the WTI price are from the U.S. Energy Information Agency; the real activity index is 
from Kilian (2009); the U.S. dollar-SDR exchange rate is from Thompson Datastream; the rig count is from Baker Hughes; 
and the governance indicators are from the World Bank. 
Prices are deflated by the 2005 U.S. CPI. Crude oil production is in thousand barrels per day. The institutional quality index 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers indicating better governance outcomes. The governance indices are available at 
annual frequency. Missing years 1997 and 1999 are completed through linear interpolation.  
 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of oil output against the development of WTI prices and indicates 
that oil production differs across the three country groups over the sample period. In particular, the 
development of oil output of the OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC groups are dissimilar in terms of 
longer-term development and short-term dynamics. We observe that total OECD output has declined 
by about 14% since the turn of the century, with Norway and the U.K. accounting for most of the 
group’s overall decline. Non-OECD/non-OPEC output has increased steadily over the entire sample 
period. Figure 1 also suggests that OECD oil output is more volatile in the short run compared to non-
OECD/non-OPEC output, whose increase has been fairly smooth and almost monotonic over the 
sample period. In contrast, OPEC output roughly followed the evolution and steady increase of the 
WTI price, although with a certain delay, which suggests that OPEC output might be more closely 








Variable Obs. From To Mean SD  Min  Max
WTI spot price (real 2005 U.S. dollars)  284 Jan 86 Aug 09 36 18  14  119
WTI price volatility  284 Jan 86 Aug 09 0.023 0.013  0.007  0.110
Kilian real activity index 284 Jan 86 Aug 09 -3.5 23.6 -57.5 55.2
Exchange rate IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) - U.S. dollar 332 Jan 82 Aug 09 0.75 0.10 0.61 1.04
Variable Obs. From To Mean SD  Min  Max
Crude oil production (thousand barrels per day)  188 Jan 94 Aug 09 31,130 2,914  26,308  36,412
Rig count  332 Jan 82 Aug 09 192 43  105  303
Institutional quality  156 1996 2008 -0.49 0.04 -0.61 -0.45
Variable Obs. From To Mean SD  Min  Max
Crude oil production (thousand barrels per day)  188 Jan 94 Aug 09 22,457 978  19,043  24,012
Rig count  332 Jan 82 Aug 09 1739 738  698  5174
Institutional quality  156 1996 2008 1.19 0.03 1.14 1.23
Variable Obs. From To Mean SD  Min  Max
Crude oil production (thousand barrels per day)  188 Jan 94 Aug 09 23,988 2,783  19,566  28,562
Rig count 332 Jan 82 Aug 09 431 88  247  591





Local variables by region  6











































































































































































Non-OECD/non-OPEC Real WTI price (right axis)
              
2.3  Intra-group dynamics in oil production – principal component analysis 
Following our descriptive analysis we now evaluate the variation in our dependent variable, oil 
production, on a country level. Our intention is to better understand the rise of “new” producing 
countries, the decrease in OECD production and the role of OPEC. We use principal component 
analysis (PCA) to investigate the structure of the production data in a naïve manner. A graphical 
representation of the major principal components allows us to evaluate the degree of similarity among 
the production decisions of various countries over time. While we are not necessarily able to interpret 
principal components in a structural way, PCA is useful for achieving deeper insights about the set-up 
of our dependent variable without having to resort to parametric estimation techniques.  
We conduct the PCA for all of OPEC, except for Iraq and Libya, and for the major producers 
from the other two groups.
6 For illustrative purposes we select three time periods to explore the 
relationship among key dimensions of oil production, given their varying behavior of the equilibrium 
price: the entire sample period; 1994-1998, a period of stagnating prices; and 2002-2006, a period of 





                                                 
6 To be consistent with our quantitative analysis we conduct the PCA using differenced production data.    7






Proportion of total 
variation explained
12 . 7 8 . 6 %
21 . 9 6 . 2 %
1 4.0 13.0%
22 . 9 9 . 3 %
1 3.2 10.4%






Table 2 shows that the first two principal components have eigenvalues clearly in excess of 1 in 
the three periods. The moderate proportion of variation explained differs by sample period. When 
there are more homogenous price developments eigenvalues are higher and a greater proportion of 
variation is explained compared to the entire period.  
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the individual countries’ production pattern over the two-
dimensional space spanned by the first two principal components for the three periods.
7 When 
considering the pattern of oil production over the entire period (Figure 2, top panel), we notice a 
relatively high degree of similarity of output variation within the OPEC group, particularly among its 
Middle Eastern and North African members. However, Latin American and Sub-Saharan African 
OPEC members are significantly removed from this pattern. There is also a high degree of overlap 
between the OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC groups 
During the low-price period 1994-1998 (Figure 2, middle panel), cohesion within the three 
country groups diminishes and there is much more overlap. For OPEC, some countries from the so-
called OPEC core (Smith, 2005) now also show signs of divergence. 
During the high-price period 2002-2006 the WTI price tripled in real terms and we see greater 
similarity among OPEC members’ output compared to the entire period (Figure 2, bottom panel). 
Output decisions appear to be well coordinated among the Middle Eastern and North African OPEC 
members, whereas Nigeria, Angola, Venezuela and Ecuador clearly diverge. Variations in the output 
of the main OECD producers also become more similar than in 1994-1998 and in the entire period. 




                                                 
7 OPEC countries are depicted as circles, OECD as squares and non-OECD/non-OPEC countries as triangles. Country labels 
correspond to the World Bank’s country coding system.   8




















































































































































While we cannot readily interpret the results of the PCA in economic terms, they support our 
findings from the previous descriptive analysis, strongly suggesting that a substantial amount of 
heterogeneity exists in the dynamics of oil output by country group, on the level of individual 
countries, and over time. Thus, we can derive two hypotheses which we discuss in the following 
sections:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Crude oil production responds to prices and price volatility. A significant 
response is expected to come for both the current and previous periods along a lag-structure 
from the very short to the longer term.    9
 
Hypothesis 2: The reaction of crude oil production to changes in prices and price volatility is 
heterogeneous among country groups as well as among members within the groups.  
 
2.4  Methodology  
Much of the existing literature based on Griffin (1985) uses logarithms of prices and quantities, 
however, the price and quantity variables especially are clearly non-stationary over the sample period 
under consideration, thus providing spurious results in unadjusted OLS regressions.
8 Therefore, 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) adapt their estimation to the presence of non-stationarity by using an error 
correction approach. Their VEC estimation finds more than one cointegration relationship in each 
case, which leads to multiple sets of estimation results and unclear interpretations. 
Therefore, we decide to trade off information content in favor of analytical clarity. We leave the 
real activity index and the standard deviation of log returns on oil unchanged, since both are stationary. 
We also leave the governance index in levels. We take first differences of the remaining variables to 
ensure covariance stationarity of our data. 
We aim to identify the effects of prices and price volatility on crude oil production based on the 
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where  , ti Q  is crude oil output by group or country and  t P  is the CPI-deflated WTI oil price
9, while 
() t t SD P Δ  is the monthly standard deviation of daily log returns of the WTI, our measure of volatility. 
t REAL  is the real activity index constructed by Kilian (2009),  , ti RIG  is the rig count, our proxy for 
investment in oil exploration and production, and  () t EX USD  is the exchange rate between the 
Special Drawing Right (SDR) and the U.S. dollar issued by the International Monetary Fund and 
represents a basket of major global currencies. Thus, this exchange rate measures the value of the U.S. 
dollar in a global context.  , ti INST  is the mean of the six WGI governance indicators and  t D  is a full 
set of monthly dummy variables to control for seasonality, such as potentially decreased oil production 
or rig activity due to adverse weather conditions.  
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are accounted for by using Newey-West corrected 
standard errors in the main regression model, with a generous autocorrelation specification of a lag up 
                                                 
8 Unit root tests reveal non-stationarity for a number of variables under consideration, while first differences are I(1). 
9 We also perform our analysis using key regional crude oil prices. The results are essentially unchanged, which provides 
additional evidence in favor of the oil market’s global integration (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006).   10
to 80 months. Since we do not include lagged output as an explanatory variable, residual 
autocorrelation will not affect the consistency of our estimations.  
We include nine years of lags for oil price, price volatility, real activity, rig count, and U.S. dollar 
exchange rate to explore the full dynamics of the spectrum of lags. For prices we include monthly lags 
for the first quarter, then lags at quarterly frequency for the remainder of the first year and yearly 
averages beyond the first year, to analyze short-term, medium-term and longer term responses of crude 
oil production to price changes. To maintain relative parsimony for our model we include quarterly 
averages for the first year for the remaining explanatory variables and yearly averages thereafter.  
 
3  Results and discussion 
We present our analysis by major country group. We first describe the results for the aggregated 
group-level regressions and then focus on some major individual countries in each group to evaluate 
our hypotheses at the country level. 
Note that while having included CIS member countries and China when presenting descriptive 
statistics, we do not consider them in the group-wise analysis due to either missing or incomplete data 
on rig count.
10 We do present results for China and Russia for a specification of our model that 
excludes rig count, given that they represent a large proportion of non-OECD/non-OPEC oil output. 
Additionally, we omit Iraq and Libya from OPEC for the group-wise analysis.
11  
While including a number of control variables in our regressions, we are mainly interested in the 





















                                                 
10 However, running the group-wise regression based on the entire sample while excluding the rig count variable does not 
significantly change our results for most variables.  
11 In Iraq, political factors strongly impacted the oil industry over the entire sample period. For Libya data on the rig count 
was only available after 2002. For Iran data on the rig count ceased in 2006; given that Iran represents a significant share of 
OPEC production and that its rig count is available for the greatest part of the sample period, we included it in the OPEC 
group.  
12 The full results are available upon request.    11
Table 3: Determinants of crude oil production, group-wise analysis 
 










Real WTI price, monthly average 0.717 4.850 4.021
(0.967) (0.590) (0.174)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-1) 43.93** -11.31* 3.136
(0.014) (0.094) (0.121)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-2) 37.34*** -22.10* -0.503
(0.001) (0.070) (0.921)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-1) 55.29 -107.8** 3.588
(0.416) (0.018) (0.834)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-2) 42.46 -47.73 9.095
(0.377) (0.318) (0.534)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-3) 6.723 -22.28 27.82*
(0.921) (0.631) (0.074)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-1) -227.6 -18.76 152.5**
(0.466) (0.954) (0.034)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-2) -281.7 -69.29 136.5**
(0.150) (0.885) (0.012)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-3) -283.5 -317.9 85.02
(0.378) (0.496) (0.360)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-4) -342.0 181.3 -25.65
(0.302) (0.441) (0.699)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-5) -667.0*** 111.6 28.06
(0.004) (0.692) (0.488)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-6) -801.0*** 164.5 60.31
(0.000) (0.694) (0.205)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-7) -593.1*** -148.8 66.75**
(0.010) (0.552) (0.043)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-8) -537.9*** -108.0 33.23
(0.005) (0.644) (0.284)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-9) -128.2 -169.3 96.08***
(0.467) (0.292) (0.000)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average -2280.5 -31416.4* 3571.9
(0.892) (0.091) (0.179)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-1) -28300.0* -19445.4 3814.2**
(0.053) (0.200) (0.012)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-2) -4256.9 -45361.2 5832.1**
(0.812) (0.190) (0.035)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-3) -12222.5 -51857.0*** 7602.3**
(0.645) (0.009) (0.047)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-1) -68432.4 -112561.3* 35889.9***
(0.446) (0.068) (0.007)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-2) -42727.4 -12441.7 22982.0***
(0.640) (0.850) (0.004)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-3) 5948.3 -77540.3 38218.6**
(0.941) (0.243) (0.010)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-4) -31194.9 -5763.1 46136.3***
(0.535) (0.928) (0.000)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-5) -85231.9** -73120.4 24259.2*
(0.041) (0.357) (0.076)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-6) -94699.2* -28556.9 24664.7**
(0.070) (0.588) (0.016)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-7) -73456.5* -58790.9 34260.1*
(0.087) (0.148) (0.055)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-8) -136500.9*** -16146.6 17953.7
(0.008) (0.576) (0.104)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-9) -60660.6** -42324.9* 4168.7
(0.035) (0.085) (0.362)
Constant 13692.3 11141.8 -3740.0**
(0.283) (0.270) (0.028)
Observations 156 156 156  12
3.1  OPEC 
Column 1 in Table 3 shows that an increase in prices leads to an increase in production at the 
group level. This output reaction is consistent with the pursuit of OPEC’s stated price stabilization 
objective. However, in the medium to long term, the relationship reverses, which suggests significant 
revenue smoothing over a longer time horizon. The country level in Table 4 shows a more mixed 
picture, although it broadly confirms the impression from the group level regression. A notable 
exception is Nigeria, which exhibits revenue smoothing from the short to medium term. For some 
countries, particularly Iran and the UAE, we also observe that while oil output positively relates to 
price changes in the short term, there is no significant reaction in the medium to longer term. The 
country-level regressions also reveal that oil output appears to respond more strongly to prices for 
certain countries, especially for Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, which appears to drive the result on the 
group level.  
OPEC as a group exhibits significant aversion to price risk, as evidenced by the negative 
reaction of production changes to increases in price volatility. This observation is borne out on the 
country level, where a majority of OPEC countries exhibit a negative relationship between changes in 
output and increases in price volatility across the lag spectrum. Past increases in volatility have strong 
negative effects on future output although with significantly differing time lags. While Saudi Arabia’s 
output decline takes place immediately, Angola’s output decreases in the medium term, and the UAE’s 
output only reacts in the longer term.  
Overall, our results regarding OPEC suggest a significant amount of coordination among OPEC 
members regarding their output reaction to changes in prices and price volatility. However, the 
coordination is imperfect, confirming the literature, e.g., Smith (2005), that OPEC seems to act like a 
bureaucratic cartel.  
 
3.2  OECD 
The group level regression for the OECD (Table 3, column 2) reveals a substantial amount of 
revenue smoothing for prices in the short term, while on the country level significant heterogeneity 
becomes apparent (Table 5, columns 1-4). We find revenue smoothing behavior especially for Norway 
and the U.S., and a positive relationship between changes in output and price in Canada and the U.K. 
The country level results suggest that aggregate results should be treated with caution, since the group 
level results may be driven by a subset of producer countries, in this case by the U.S.  
OECD also shows signs of aversion to price risk on the group level, although to a lesser degree 
than OPEC. On the country level it becomes clear that the majority of the major OECD producers 
seem to be risk averse with respect to price volatility, the clear exception being Norway, which 
exhibits a strong positive relationship between the level of price volatility and changes in the growth of 
output across most of the lag spectrum.    13
Overall our results on the country level show that OECD producers constitute a heterogeneous 
group with respect to both prices and price volatility. 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of crude oil production, OPEC producers 
 








( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Algeria Angola Iran Kuwait Nigeria
Saudi 
Arabia UAE Venezuela
Real WTI price, monthly average -0.752 2.554 -2.276 1.945 -1.399 2.689 0.0340 2.735
(0.216) (0.158) (0.799) (0.294) (0.757) (0.573) (0.992) (0.522)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-1) -0.555 2.719* 5.716 4.540** -6.719*** 22.39** 10.39* 23.10
(0.271) (0.058) (0.153) (0.018) (0.000) (0.017) (0.078) (0.126)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-2) 1.124 0.519 11.69* 3.461 -9.811*** 29.24*** 6.468*** 31.44
(0.193) (0.787) (0.073) (0.115) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.104)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-1) -0.351 4.075 22.69 1.649 -34.14*** 84.54*** 26.71 44.77
(0.846) (0.355) (0.438) (0.678) (0.006) (0.001) (0.162) (0.264)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-2) -2.364 9.330 32.24 0.232 -44.40*** 83.91*** 27.90 51.27
(0.265) (0.127) (0.355) (0.970) (0.000) (0.000) (0.409) (0.449)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-3) -4.701** 8.590 46.00* -0.771 -36.19*** 51.67* 26.95 48.04
(0.035) (0.402) (0.060) (0.931) (0.006) (0.100) (0.391) (0.471)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-1) -23.70*** 32.61 107.6 13.03 -95.97* 65.65 146.7 -17.37
(0.006) (0.262) (0.252) (0.639) (0.064) (0.588) (0.235) (0.929)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-2) -33.02*** -19.06 350.5 -4.970 -120.9** 14.72 161.1 -133.1
(0.001) (0.311) (0.107) (0.844) (0.037) (0.900) (0.273) (0.336)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-3) -41.62** -24.77 182.1 -46.63 -87.95* -122.8 101.7 -167.7
(0.038) (0.306) (0.459) (0.371) (0.069) (0.123) (0.202) (0.385)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-4) -8.455 -28.50** 145.5 -36.23 48.87 -158.1 74.71 -260.7*
(0.543) (0.049) (0.359) (0.378) (0.578) (0.180) (0.156) (0.080)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-5) -25.67** -23.66* 112.8 -28.98 36.52 -460.1** 102.2 -279.5*
(0.028) (0.099) (0.313) (0.493) (0.585) (0.029) (0.216) (0.094)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-6) -32.68*** -35.63* 107.6 -40.01 106.5 -512.7*** 55.37 -454.9***
(0.005) (0.053) (0.190) (0.203) (0.175) (0.002) (0.594) (0.001)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-7) -14.53 -27.20** 43.50 10.82 5.056 -297.8*** 23.03 -244.8**
(0.201) (0.024) (0.407) (0.645) (0.868) (0.000) (0.704) (0.023)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-8) -18.73 15.91 -41.30 -3.776 54.87* -232.5*** -32.06 -78.99
(0.102) (0.504) (0.187) (0.735) (0.067) (0.002) (0.505) (0.546)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-9) -11.53*** 13.65 -93.43 29.51** 14.46 -44.53 -11.81 -3.567
(0.007) (0.309) (0.161) (0.026) (0.408) (0.430) (0.651) (0.965)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average -293.3 1639.9 -4957.9 161.1 -1575.5 -6724.1 -2646.5 10271.7**
(0.611) (0.291) (0.334) (0.925) (0.658) (0.456) (0.534) (0.048)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-1) -1089.1*** -1435.4 793.2 -1087.7 -6629.2*** -13393.5***-1825.0 3932.9
(0.003) (0.265) (0.848) (0.528) (0.005) (0.000) (0.394) (0.615)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-2) 1473.0* -2162.4 1560.0 4103.7 -8441.8*** 1365.7 847.1 3912.7
(0.091) (0.154) (0.854) (0.210) (0.006) (0.897) (0.777) (0.695)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-3) -706.9 -172.9 -6347.2 2271.0 -5428.9*** -8890.4 148.8 892.9
(0.509) (0.913) (0.611) (0.570) (0.010) (0.458) (0.970) (0.932)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-1) 1998.5 -3460.0 -87263.5 5565.4 -13538.0 -47047.2 -14209.2 1817.3
(0.489) (0.241) (0.220) (0.722) (0.255) (0.199) (0.185) (0.972)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-2) 3016.5** -1045.6 -67133.2* -6821.2 -9931.9** 14037.5 -12562.6 -36828.3
(0.039) (0.659) (0.070) (0.304) (0.041) (0.587) (0.157) (0.444)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-3) -439.1 2815.3 -50087.4** 899.7 -19575.1** 38247.1 -1330.9 20717.3
(0.692) (0.510) (0.050) (0.882) (0.034) (0.111) (0.840) (0.470)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-4) 3004.9* -10036.5** 2283.0 12837.3* -21909.5 24133.3 729.9 -23904.2
(0.074) (0.049) (0.945) (0.084) (0.103) (0.235) (0.896) (0.456)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-5) 820.9 -9938.5 17811.6 -3407.3 -15008.1 -4076.9 -2336.7 22027.0
(0.623) (0.159) (0.489) (0.664) (0.290) (0.699) (0.823) (0.461)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-6) -423.3 -9860.9* 5607.3 -4973.3 -7555.9 5651.9 -355.2 -10853.1
(0.852) (0.057) (0.681) (0.113) (0.644) (0.763) (0.957) (0.280)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-7) 1671.0 -5423.4* -5272.7 -4128.0 -7958.3 1233.0 2617.6 -8418.5
(0.568) (0.097) (0.770) (0.182) (0.654) (0.954) (0.864) (0.608)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-8) 1865.9 -4390.5** 28219.3*** -7769.5*** -755.8 -13014.7 -16457.5** -67611.6**
(0.511) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.944) (0.380) (0.025) (0.043)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-9) 874.9 -110.5 14092.5 1268.7 -11045.6** 18205.8 -3153.6 -60934.3*
(0.447) (0.952) (0.124) (0.793) (0.020) (0.237) (0.716) (0.056)
Constant 52.26 1119.9** 2873.1 199.2 3308.7 -281.2 944.8 -1052.8
(0.880) (0.046) (0.472) (0.788) (0.114) (0.943) (0.485) (0.772)
Observations 156 156 125 156 156 156 156 156
Mean share in group production 5.5% 3.3% 12.4% 7.4% 7.1% 31.3% 8.4% 9.6%  14
Table 5: Determinants of crude oil production, OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC producers  
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; robust p-values in parentheses. 
 
3.3  Non-OECD/non-OPEC 
The non-OECD/non-OPEC group exhibits a positive relationship between changes in output 
and changes in price growth in the medium term. Again, this relationship is less clear when 
considering the country level (Table 5, columns 5-8). While oil output in China and Brazil shows a 
positive reaction to price changes, Russia exhibits significant revenue smoothing with respect to 
prices, and Indonesia is an intermediate case.  





States Brazil Indonesia Russia China
Real WTI price, monthly average 0.274 3.667 2.638 -11.97* 4.433* -0.774 -2.512 -1.885
(0.951) (0.586) (0.505) (0.068) (0.059) (0.184) (0.242) (0.289)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-1) 1.206 5.800 -4.471 -13.11* 5.409*** -2.656*** -3.401*** 2.593
(0.501) (0.405) (0.474) (0.058) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.285)
Real WTI price, monthly average (-2) -2.409 2.162 -1.676 -34.09*** 1.177 -1.898* -3.719 3.381*
(0.500) (0.809) (0.859) (0.003) (0.589) (0.068) (0.311) (0.074)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-1) 20.80 -42.04 -26.20 -143.5*** 2.086 -7.645** -18.82* 10.39
(0.108) (0.236) (0.422) (0.006) (0.736) (0.012) (0.050) (0.271)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-2) 24.17** -83.84* 20.78 -120.1** 6.631 -4.029 -27.91* 19.72**
(0.045) (0.059) (0.495) (0.011) (0.242) (0.395) (0.058) (0.028)
Real WTI price, quarterly average (-3) 26.61* -145.0*** 51.35* -104.9*** 11.58* -5.384 -35.60* 27.28**
(0.071) (0.000) (0.078) (0.007) (0.066) (0.295) (0.086) (0.018)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-1) 166.4* -684.9*** 172.0* -150.2 46.34* -8.912 -135.4* 123.4***
(0.066) (0.000) (0.071) (0.392) (0.078) (0.641) (0.082) (0.003)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-2) 102.1 -445.7*** 2.979 -141.1 30.46* -7.797 -85.35 100.3**
(0.379) (0.004) (0.984) (0.606) (0.077) (0.620) (0.253) (0.029)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-3) 132.2 -436.5*** -78.05 -347.6 -5.502 -12.05 -43.17 94.15**
(0.225) (0.002) (0.638) (0.401) (0.830) (0.540) (0.192) (0.049)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-4) 81.46 -132.7 25.43 -45.85 -31.83 -3.263 41.19 58.88
(0.311) (0.164) (0.757) (0.819) (0.304) (0.869) (0.327) (0.133)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-5) 67.33 -286.0*** 84.34 313.2 -25.45 26.73* -13.44 11.59
(0.432) (0.007) (0.234) (0.324) (0.195) (0.080) (0.872) (0.683)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-6) 50.10 -90.21 108.6** 71.21 -7.361 30.94*** 13.01 3.501
(0.568) (0.312) (0.023) (0.822) (0.723) (0.002) (0.818) (0.867)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-7) -12.70 -233.7** 51.86 -12.62 -0.607 29.56** -17.20 12.93
(0.859) (0.022) (0.423) (0.950) (0.972) (0.011) (0.611) (0.629)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-8) -23.84 34.37 72.92** -168.2 1.964 10.27 -1.023 30.73***
(0.604) (0.598) (0.032) (0.280) (0.890) (0.203) (0.976) (0.005)
Real WTI price, yearly average (-9) -20.21 12.24 4.559 -89.63 39.74** -5.945 -42.45** 12.54
(0.471) (0.886) (0.917) (0.274) (0.039) (0.313) (0.017) (0.175)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average 783.0 12707.9*** 1870.5 -29338.3** 1955.5 -403.5 -1468.6 339.8
(0.679) (0.007) (0.637) (0.035) (0.118) (0.629) (0.604) (0.842)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-1) -1089.0 9212.3** -3565.7 -30572.8** -68.47 -529.7 -2018.4 1383.6
(0.713) (0.012) (0.311) (0.017) (0.942) (0.731) (0.142) (0.370)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-2) -2555.5 5762.6 -1769.0 -20783.8 595.5 281.9 -1669.4 2340.7
(0.682) (0.386) (0.512) (0.380) (0.777) (0.839) (0.330) (0.257)
Std. dev. (log price returns), quarterly average (-3) 944.8 1955.5 -5636.8 -39457.5* 1361.4 -1271.6 -3172.5 -64.29
(0.857) (0.748) (0.456) (0.096) (0.510) (0.467) (0.269) (0.980)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-1) -5371.3 -4061.8 8283.8 -54445.3 5094.9 -64.49 -6210.9 1939.9
(0.826) (0.843) (0.807) (0.415) (0.559) (0.987) (0.625) (0.717)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-2) -4339.0 15954.4 7381.0 -21645.9 -1923.3 -3678.4** 1991.4 2594.7
(0.858) (0.462) (0.577) (0.358) (0.831) (0.044) (0.693) (0.519)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-3) -1369.2 22639.5 -32129.7***-125878.2*** 6637.0 -7656.3*** -2976.4 -2510.1
(0.940) (0.472) (0.000) (0.000) (0.578) (0.002) (0.497) (0.665)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-4) -6587.4 56011.4*** -4073.1 -105285.9*** 12025.6* 437.0 -493.8 6338.3
(0.716) (0.000) (0.701) (0.006) (0.055) (0.924) (0.947) (0.185)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-5) -10943.8 45704.6*** -1921.7 -79307.2*** 4586.2 2756.6 870.2 -1099.7
(0.574) (0.000) (0.925) (0.003) (0.644) (0.561) (0.877) (0.862)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-6) -5005.0 40151.9*** 16694.8 -80911.3*** 6351.8 1765.2 7888.9** 7989.3*
(0.706) (0.000) (0.441) (0.000) (0.510) (0.560) (0.018) (0.081)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-7) -4445.1 29229.8* 33174.1** -101743.1*** 9322.9 -207.6 2087.5 11842.0***
(0.668) (0.087) (0.017) (0.002) (0.321) (0.913) (0.507) (0.003)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-8) -16241.9** 35996.2*** 26486.5* -24464.9 3348.1 2752.8 5075.2** 4194.6
(0.017) (0.005) (0.086) (0.489) (0.604) (0.366) (0.030) (0.222)
Std. dev. (log price returns), yearly average (-9) -2444.7 4469.4 -3550.4 2176.3 5549.3 2046.0** -749.3 -4890.8
(0.777) (0.676) (0.664) (0.925) (0.326) (0.038) (0.798) (0.182)
Constant 1248.6 1725.9 -2125.4* 18149.5*** -1191.1 249.3 219.7 -850.0
(0.549) (0.531) (0.090) (0.000) (0.371) (0.652) (0.698) (0.305)
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
Mean share in group production 12.9% 13.5% 10.5% 39.8% 6.9% 5.7% 32.4% 14.6%
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Only the non-OECD/non-OPEC group shows a positive relationship between price volatility 
and changes in output on the group level, possibly because the group represents producers which are 
less risk averse and may therefore increase production when price volatility rises. The results are less 
clear when considering the country level, especially for Indonesia. However, overall positive and 
significant coefficients dominate. 
Thus, while exhibiting substantial heterogeneity in the reaction of output to price changes, the 
non-OECD/non-OPEC group seems to be more homogenous than OECD in responding to price 
volatility. The lower degree of risk aversion sets it apart from the others, further validating our division 
of the non-OPEC countries into OECD and non-OECD/non-OPEC groups.  
 
4  Conclusions 
In this paper we contribute to the empirical literature on the global crude oil market by providing 
a substantive empirical analysis of the dynamics of global production. We analyze the response of oil 
production to key global and local determinants of oil producers’ output decisions, such as prices, 
price volatility, investment, real economic activity, the strength of the U.S. dollar and indicators of 
institutional quality, based on a rich dataset covering global crude oil production at monthly frequency. 
However, while controlling for important explanatory factors, we focus our analysis on oil prices and 
price volatility. We conduct the analysis for the three country groups, OPEC, OECD and non-
OECD/non-OPEC, and for selected countries representing the majority of each group’s oil production.  
Based on a descriptive analysis we motivate the division of the countries in our sample into the 
three groups and then derive two hypotheses. To the best of our knowledge this is the first contribution 
that separates non-OPEC producers and provides individual analyses for all three groups. Our first 
hypothesis states that the proper modeling requires a dynamic model specification, since crude oil 
production responds to crude oil prices and price volatility not only in the current period, but over a 
range of lags, varying from the short term to the longer term. The second hypothesis states that the 
output response varies among the three groups of countries, as well as within each country group. 
Having specified a generous lag structure ranging from the current period to a lag of nine years, we 
find that oil output reacts to the entire lag spectrum of current and past prices and volatilities, which 
confirms the first hypothesis. Furthermore, substantial heterogeneity exists in the response of oil 
output in most cases, which confirms the second hypothesis.  
  Specifically, we find that OPEC production is consistent with price stabilization in the short 
term and with revenue smoothing in the medium to longer term. We also find strong evidence for price 
risk aversion in the oil output decisions of OPEC countries. The group of OECD countries exhibits a 
significantly higher degree of heterogeneity among its major oil producers. We find substantial 
evidence of revenue smoothing with respect to the oil price in the short to medium term. We also find 
a significant amount of aversion to price risk, with the exception of Norway. We find a largely positive   16
reaction of output to price changes across the major producers in the non-OECD/non-OPEC group. 
Furthermore, third group exhibits the least amount of aversion to price risk of our three groups.  
In conclusion, OPEC output decisions appear to be better coordinated than those of either 
OECD or non-OECD/non-OPEC, although we note the coordination is imperfect. Also, substantial 
differences in the response of oil output, particularly its reaction to price volatility, validate separating 
the non-OPEC countries into two groups.  
The implication for further research is straightforward. Oil production differs across countries, 
regardless of OPEC membership and thus, findings should not be generalized. We suggest that 
researchers should closely examine the rise of developing and non-industrialized countries for lessons 
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